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Rural Financial Markets and Income Distribution 
in Low Income Countries 
By 
Dale W Adams* 
The past several decades a large amount of attention 
has been given to agricultural credit programs in low 
income countries. This has been justified by the positive 
impact that loans are thought to have on agricultural 
production. While some attempts have been made to form 
cheap credit programs for the rural poor, few questions 
have been raised about the ways and extent to which financial 
markets affect income distribution (Boulding and Wilson). 
A widely held assumption is that the normal workings 
of financial markets have little impact on these distri-
butions, and that a few carefully chosen policies can 
tilt the operations of these markets in favor of the poor. 
In the following discussion I will argue this assump-
tion is incorrect and that the workings of rural financial 
markets in most low income countries are causing much more 
inequitable distributions of income. The operations of 
financial markets may affect income distributions in 
three ways: through the net returns that borrowers realize 
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from activities financed by loans, through negative real 
rates of interest charged on loans and paid on deposits, 
and through default on loan repayment. I also argue that 
cheap credit combined with inflation are major factors 
that help explain this problem. 
Net Returns from Borrowing 
People who are honest and incur positive real costs of 
borrowing request loans because they hope to make a net 
return from the use of borrowed monies. Those individuals 
successful in increasing their net returns through the use 
of loans may boost their income relative to those who do 
not use loans, and also improve their income over what it 
would have been without a loan. If returns from invest-
ments are high, those individuals and firms that borrow 
may rapidly increase their incomes in comparison with 
those who do not borrow. Loans allow aggressive entre-
preneurs to capitalize on investment opportunities 
immediately, rather than waiting until they can assemble 
their own surpluses. Loans allow compounding of income 
growth because borrowers are able to use, not only the 
additional resources that the loan allows, but they are 
able to invest the additional net returns realized from 
borrowed funds. 
Little research has been done on the extent to which 
these net returns from borrowing affect income distribution; 
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they have to be substantial, however. It is widely held 
that one of the main functions of financial markets is to 
allocate claims on resources from individuals with low 
pay-off opportunities to those with high pay-off investments. 
Most people feel this is a legitimate way to increase 
income, and there have been few ethical questions raised 
about it. It is generally held that this is a proper 
reward for those willing to take the risks necessary to be 
levered entrepreneurs. 
Negative Real Rates of Interest 
In sharp contrast, there is a good deal of controversy 
over the ethics of transferring income to borrowers through 
negative real rates of interest. Most governments regulate 
interest rates in formal financial markets. Some regulations 
are tied to controlling usury, others result from attempts 
to manage the economy, still other interest rate regula-
tions are aimed at aiding a particular activity or group. 
Suppression of interest rates is particularly severe in 
rural financial markets in low income countries. In these 
countries interest rates on agricultural credit are set 
well below rates on commercial, non-agricultural loans. 
It is also typical that loans to small farmers and other 
rural poor carry even lower interest rate ceilings. 
Because interest rates on formal rural loans are set low, 
rates paid on rural savings deposits are set even lower (Kane). 
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Interest rates are prices. Unlike prices on physical 
goods, however, financial instruments may have two prices: 
nominal and real)/ The nominal interest rate, or price, 
is the contractual interest rate included in loan agree-
ments; it is the 5 percent received on savings accounts in 
commercial banks, the 15 percent that one pays on a home 
mortgage, and the 18 percent one pays if an account is not 
paid in full monthly. Nominal interest rates are the 
prices of' financial instruments that most people talk 
about and readily recognize. 
It is possible to ignore real interest rates when 
there is little or no change in overall prices. Inflation 
or deflation, however, cause a divergence between nominal 
and real rates of interest. Because financial instruments 
are claims on resources, and not real resources, their 
value is represented by their purchasing power. The 
purchasing power of these instruments may change over time, 
depending on what happens to overall prices. The purchasing 
power of financial instruments varies inversely with 
changes in overall prices. These changes in the purchasing 
power of financial instruments, or changes in real price, 
!I The real rate of interest is the nominal rate of interest 
adjusted by the percentage change in some p~ice index: 
e.g. consumer prices. Where the percentage change in 
prices is small the real rate of interest is approximately 
equal to the nominal rate of interest minus the change in 
the price index. If there are large changes in overall 
prices, the real rate of interest is equal to l+i _ 1, where 
l+p 
i equals the nominal rate of interest and p equals the change 
in the price index. 
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occur independent of the fixed nominal interest rate or 
nominal price. The real interest rate or price of a 
financial instrument, unlike real goods prices, can result 
in negative rates if changes in prices exceed nominal rates 
of interest. 
An example may help to clarify the difference between 
nominal and real interest rates. Let's assume that a 
person has a hundred dollars at the beginning of the year. 
They have the choice of using that money to buy an inexpen-
sive 3-piece suit or placing the money in a savings account 
and receiving a 5 percent nominal interest payment.~/ Let's 
further assume that they cannot make up their minds about 
the kind and color of suit they want and decide to deposit 
the money for a year. They are living in a country where 
.overall prices go up by 15 percent during the 12 months 
that their money is on deposit. At the end of the year 
they withdraw the deposit and receive the principal plus 
$5 in interest, a total of $105. They take this money to 
the local department store with a clear idea of the kind 
of suit they want to buy. To their discomfort, however, 
they find that the inexpensive suit they want, that sold 
12 months ago for $100, now costs $115. The purchasing 
power of their money, even with the nominal interest earned, 
~ Compliments of Regulation Q . 
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has declined to the point that they are forced to buy the 
suit without the vest. The real price or value of their 
claims on resources went down by about 10 percent during 
the year that they stored them with the financial inter-
mediary. 
This lost purchasing power did not evaporate into thin 
air. The depositors' loss was someone elses gain. The 
gains were passed along to those able to get loans from the 
intermediary at concessionary interest rates. That is, at 
rates that are lower than the expected rate of inflation. 
Let's say that the borrower is the owner of the department 
store, and assume that they are able to get the loan at a 
nominal interest rate only slightly above the 5 percent that 
the bank pays to the depositor, say 6 percent per year. The 
owner decides to invest the borrowed money in additional 
inventory of inexpensive suits. At the end of the year the 
store owner finds that the suit inventory has increased in 
value by 15 percent. The borrower can sell this inventory, 
repay the loan, pay the 6 percent interest, and still 
realize an almost 10 percent gain from borrowing and holding 
additional inventory. When rates of inflation exceed nominal 
interest rates, borrowers received income transfers, almost 
equal to the purchasing power lost by depositors. 
Negatlve real rates of interest not only transfer income 
from depositor to borrowers, but also affect income distri:-
butions among borrowers. Because the income transfer from 
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negative interest rates is proportional to the size of the 
loan, borrowers of large amounts receive much larger subsi-
dies than do borrowers of small amounts (Gonzalez-Vega, 
1977). It goes without saying that non-borrowers receive 
no benefits from cheap credit. 
What has all this to do with income distributions in 
low income countries and with rural financial markets? 
Most low income countries have fixed and low nominal interest 
rates on formal agricultural credit, have rates of inflation 
that substantially exceed nominal interest rates, and are 
aggressively expanding the amount of money lent at conces-
sionary rates. Negative real rates of interest are in force 
in almost all of these countries on rapidly increasing 
amounts of money lent. In Brazil the income transfers due 
to negative real rates of interest in rural financial 
markets on an annual basis is several billions of dollars 
(Sayad). In other countries like India and Mexico the 
amount transferred approaches a billion dollars each year 
(Reynolds and Corredor). In still other countries such as 
Venezuela, Colombia, The Philippines, and Thailand the 
annual transfer is in the hundreds of millions. 
While some people have argued that financial markets 
can be used to tilt this income transfer in favor of the 
poor, recent research results strongly suggest this may not 
be possible. Negative real rates of interest force lenders, 
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both private and governmental, to ration cheap loans 
(Vogel 1981). When real rates of interest on loans are 
negative, borrowers who get these loans, and also incur 
only modest additional loan transaction costs, have almost 
in~atiable loan demand due to the implied income transfer 
or subsidy associated with negative real rates of interest. 
Individuals can capture these subsidies by converting the 
loan into any kind of real asset that appreciates in value 
more rapidly than the rate of inflation: e.g. land, cattle, 
gold, crop inventories, machinery. When the real asset is 
liquidated to repay the loan the borrower only repays part 
of the purchasing power that was received from the lender 
and is able to retain part of the purchasing power despite 
having paid a nominal interest payment. 
When interest rates are negative in real terms, 
influential borrowers have powerful incentives to stroke 
formal lenders into giving them loans. At the same time, 
the formal lender is very susceptible to being stroked. 
With excess demand for the supply of cheap loans available, 
lenders can select mainly those loan applications that 
minimize the total transaction costs of lending. Per unit 
of money lent, it is cheaper for the lender to extend 
large loans than it is small loans (Gonzalez-Vega, 1981). 
It is also less expensive to lend to borrowers who have 
previously borrowed from the. lender than it is to assemble 
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costly creditworthiness information on new customers. 
Because the lender is doing the borrower a substantial 
favor in granting the negatively priced loan, borrowers 
may find it in their interest to give the lender gifts. 
The lender can also insist on very secure loan collateral. 
This excess demand, and the rationing process it 
forces on formal lender, results in most of the cheap 
loahs going to the well-to-do and the politically influ-
ential (Robert). The borrowers of small amounts, the 
individuals who have not done business with the formal 
lender, and those who have weak collateral find it very 
difficult to stick their noses into the stream of subsidies 
involved in concessionary priced credit (Vogel 1977, Adams 
and Tommy). Formal lenders may make a token number of loans 
to the rural poor for purposes of public relations. Most 
of the rural poor, however, will be excluded from formal 
loans by rude treatment, long waits in line to process loan 
applications, unreasonable loan collateral requirements and 
credit terms that are very inflexible and undesirable from 
the viewpoint of the borrower (Adams and Nehman). Because 
of interest rate restrictions the poor also receive very low 
rates of return on their savings accounts. The rich can find 
higher return investments. 
Default Transfers 
In a number of low income countries a substantial 
percent of the loans made by formal rural lenders is not 
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repaid. Recently, the Philippines, Ghana, and Jamaica 
among others, have had a very difficult time collecting 
a substantial amount of the money lent in some agricultural 
credit programs. Default leakage to the tune of tens of 
millions of dollars per year is not uncommon. When a loan 
is not repayed, it obviously involves an income transfer 
from the lender to the borrower. As with the income transfer 
associated with the negative real rates of interest, the 
default transfer is proportional to the size of the loan. 
Defaulting borrowers of large loans receive large transfers. 
Borrowers of small amounts who default get small transfers, 
and those individuals who get no formal loans do not 
participate in income transfers through loan default. 
While it is often true that small borrowers may make 
up a large majority of the total number of defaulted loans, 
it is also true that, in terms of the total amount of 
money in defaulted loans, big borrowers bulk large. It 
is also true that large defaulters, who are also politically 
influential, receive relatively little press coverage while 
small borrowers who default attract a good deal more public 
attention. It is often possible for those who have poli-
tical and economic clout to resist pressure from formal 
lenders to repay their loans (Ladrnan and Tinnerrneier) . 
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Policy Implications 
It is becoming increasingly app'arent that rural 
financial markets are having a very adverse impact on the 
distribution of income as well as assets in most of the 
low income countries. Only those who receive the bulk 
of the formal loans get the net returns from credit use, 
receive the income transfer due to the negative real rates 
of interest, and also capture most of the benefits of not 
repaying the loan. In Latin America, for example, about 
3 percent of the agricultural producers receive 80 percent 
of the total value of formal loans (Gonzalez-Vega, 1981). 
Those who do not borrow, who borrow only small amounts, or 
those who are forced to hold part of their savings in 
accounts that pay negative real rates of interest fall 
behind in the process. These income distribution problems 
increase in importance when formal rural financial markets 
expand, real rates of interest are highly negative, and/or 
when many formal loans are not repaid. Large numbers of 
countries fall into this category currently. 
The most common reaction to these problems is to 
attempt to increase the amount of financial market regulation. 
This includes nationalization of banks, loan portfolio 
restrictions, and political harranging. Typically, th.e 
results of increased regulation is different from what was 
anticipated because of the fungible nature of financial 
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instruments. After looking at the operations of rural 
financial markets in a number of low income countries, 
I believe that it is virtually impossible to reduce 
inequalities in income distributions through financial 
market subsidies. Most attempts to do so will mainly 
benefit the rich. At the same time I also believe that 
reforms in current financial market policies would force 
these markets to sharply reduce the amount of income and 
asset distribution concentration that they are currently 
causing. More flexible and generally positive real rates 
of interest are key factors in these necessary changes. 
The main question is, will those who currently benefit from 
cheap credit policies allow these changes to take place? 
Because of the nature of finance I feel that it is 
virtually impossible to adjust the performance of rural 
financial markets so that they will benefit the poor at 
the expense of the rich. Under the very best of circum-
stances, financial markets can have a neutral to slightly 
negative effect on income distributions . 
